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t is a pleasure and indeed an honor to introduce colleagues, both old
and new, in this collection of articles and essays. In many ways, this is
somewhat of a repeat performance: a number of the authors con-
tained in this volume joined me in a securities symposium for the Mary-
land Law Review in 1987 when I was a faculty member of that superb law
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school.1 Much has changed in the (nearly ten!) years since, and therefore
we once again find ourselves together.
This Issue of the SMU Law Review begins and ends primarily with a
major piece of legislation: the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995. But its scope extends further, as it usually must, to treat additional
issues facing securities law scholars and practitioners today.
Prior to turning to the articles herein, this Article examines the key
piece of federal securities legislation enacted in the 1990s: The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
I. THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT:
REVIEW AND COMMENTARY
Reacting to perceived abuses by "strike suit" lawyers in the securities
law arena and seeking to enhance private enterprise, the U.S. Congress
overrode President Clinton's veto to enact the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995 ("Litigation Reform Act"). 2 This legislation has
major impact in several respects, including with respect to class action
litigation, sanctions for abusive litigation, pleading requirements, propor-
tionate liability, and forward-looking statements made by issuers as well
as others. 3
This Article reviews several key components of the Litigation Reform
Act. In certain respects, the legislation will deter the initiation of private
litigation under the federal securities laws.
A. CLASS ACTION REFORM
The Litigation Reform Act amends both the Securities Act of 1933
("1933 Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") to
add new Sections 27(a) and 21D(a), respectively. These sections are in-
tended to address the problem of "professional plaintiffs" and other abu-
sive practices in private securities class actions. The content of these
sections includes the following:
(1) A requirement that each plaintiff seeking to serve as a representa-
tive party on behalf of a class file with the complaint a sworn certification
that: (i) the plaintiff reviewed the complaint and authorized its filing; (ii)
the plaintiff did not purchase the securities in question at the direction of
counsel or in order to participate in a private action; (iii) the plaintiff is
willing to both serve as a representative party on behalf of the class and
provide both deposition and trial testimony; (iv) sets forth all of such
plaintiff's particular securities transactions that are the subject of the class
action; (v) identifies any other action filed during the preceding three-
year period in which the plaintiff sought to serve as a representative party
1. Symposium, Affirmative Disclosure Obligations Under the Securities Laws, 46 MD.
L. REv. 915 (1987).
2. See Senate Overrides President's Veto; Securities Litigation Reform Bill Now Law,
28 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 5, 1996).
3. See generally the articles in this Issue that address the Litigation Reform Act.
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on behalf of a class; and (vi) the plaintiff will not accept payment for
serving as a representative party on behalf of a class beyond the plaintiff's
pro rata share of any recovery, except as approved by the court. The
plaintiff's filed certification will not be deemed a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege.
(2) Guidelines for early notice (not later than twenty days after the
filing of the complaint) to class members pertaining to the appointment
of the lead plaintiff. Such notice must appear "in a widely circulated na-
tional business-oriented publication or wire service." Within sixty days of
such publication, any member of the purported class may seek to serve as
lead plaintiff.
(3) Provisions requiring the court to consider any motion by a pur-
ported class member in response to the class notice to be appointed as the
lead plaintiff. These provisions require the court to adopt a rebuttable
presumption that the "most adequate plaintiff' is the person with the
largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class, but allows for
discovery on such motions in limited circumstances. However, these pro-
visions also mandate restrictions on "professional plaintiffs" in declaring
that, except as the court may otherwise permit (such as with respect to
institutional investors), a person may be a lead plaintiff (or an officer,
director, or fiduciary of a lead plaintiff) in no more than five securities
class actions brought as plaintiff class actions during any three-year
period.
(4) Provisions limiting the lead plaintiff's recovery to its proportionate
share of any judgment or settlement, as well as reasonable costs and ex-
penses, including lost wages.
(5) The prohibition of settlements under seal except in limited
circumstances.
(6) Provisions limiting the award of attorneys' fees and expenses to a
"reasonable percentage" of the amount of any damages and prejudgment
interest "actually paid" to the class. These provisions do not address how
attorneys' fees should be calculated in cases where the relief awarded or
settlement does not include monetary damages.
(7) Specific and mandatory procedures for the disclosure of settlement
terms to class members (including disclosure of the amount of plaintiff
recovery, statement of attorneys' fees and costs sought, identification of
lawyers' representatives for the plaintiff class to answer questions, and
statement of the reasons for settlement).
(8) Provisions requiring the court to determine whether an interest on
the part of plaintiff's counsel in the securities in question constitutes a
conflict of interest sufficient to disqualify the attorney from representing
the party.
In addition, the 1934 Act is amended to authorize the court to require
security for payment of class action fees and expenses.
These sections taken together should reduce the abusive practices of
plaintiffs' counsel in securities class actions. However, it is evident that
1996]
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the efficacy of these sections will depend on the extent to which institu-
tional investors choose to "come forward" and utilize the new
framework.
B. SANCTIONS FOR ABUSIVE LITIGATION
The Litigation Reform Act amends the 1933 and 1934 Acts to mandate
court review, upon final adjudication of private securities actions there-
under, of the parties' or their attorneys' compliance with Rule 11(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requirements for a good faith fac-
tual and legal basis as to any pleading or dispositive motion. If the court
finds that there is a "substantial failure" of the parties or attorneys to
comply with its provisions, the court is directed to impose mandatory
sanctions in accordance with Rule 11.
The provisions set forth a rebuttable presumption in favor of the award
being the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a direct result
of the violation. This presumption may be rebutted by the sanctioned
party or attorney only upon proof that (i) the award will present an un-
reasonable burden or (ii) the violation was "de minimis."
C. STAY OF DISCOVERY AND PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE
The Litigation Reform Act amends the 1933 and 1934 Acts to provide
for (i) a stay of discovery during the pendency of any motion to dismiss
unless the court finds that particularized discovery is necessary to pre-
serve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to a party; and (ii) the pres-
ervation of the evidence that is relevant to the allegations of the
complaint during the pendency of any stay of discovery. A party ag-
grieved by the willful failure of an opposing party to comply with the
provisions requiring preservation of evidence may seek appropriate sanc-
tions. These provisions will undoubtedly eliminate some of the burden of
expenses incurred by defendants who succeed in having the complaint in
question dismissed.
D. AUDITOR DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE FRAUD
The Litigation Reform Act amends the 1934 Act by adding a new Sec-
tion 10A thereto. New Section 10A sets forth requirements for audits
conducted by an independent public accountant of an issuer's financial
statements to include certain procedures to (i) detect illegal acts that
would have a direct and material effect on the determination of financial
statement amounts; (ii) identify related party transactions material to fi-
nancial statements; and (iii) evaluate an issuer's ability to continue as a
going concern. The statutory language makes clear that the above proce-
dures are to be carried out in accordance with current generally accepted
accounting principles, "as may be modified from time to time by the
[SECI." The existing auditing standards provide for all three types of
procedures prescribed in the new section.
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This section further specifies notification and reporting guidelines for a
public accountant who becomes aware of information indicating possible
illegal activities during the course of an audit. The provisions also appear
to codify current generally accepted accounting principles. If, in the
course of an audit the public accountant detects or otherwise becomes
aware of information indicating that an illegal act has or may have oc-
curred, notwithstanding such act's perceived materiality to the issuer's fi-
nancial statements, the accountant must (i) determine the likelihood that
an illegal act has occurred; (ii) determine the possible effect of the illegal
act on the issuer's financial statements, including contingent effects such
as fines, penalties, or damages; and (iii) inform appropriate management
and assure that the issuer's audit committee or, if none, its board of direc-
tors, is adequately informed (unless such illegal act clearly is
inconsequential).
The lone new requirement imposed on such accountants exists if such
an accountant concludes that (i) the illegal act has a material effect on the
issuer's financial statements; (ii) senior management has not taken
"timely and appropriate remedial action" with respect to the illegal act;
and (iii) the failure to take "remedial action" is likely to cause the ac-
countant to depart from a standard report or to resign from its capacity as
auditor. Under these conditions, the accountant must, "as soon as is
practicable," report its conclusions to the board of directors. A board of
directors receiving a report from such an accountant must inform the
SEC within one business day of receipt of the report and must give the
accountant a copy of the notice sent to the SEC. If, however, the ac-
countant does not receive a copy of the notice within this time, it must
resign from the engagement or furnish the SEC with a copy of its report
(or documentation of its oral report) to the board of directors within one
business day after the issuer fails to provide to the accountant the notice
copy. Even if the accountant resigns, it must still furnish the SEC with a
copy of its report within the same time period.
Fortunately, the new section further stipulates that an accountant that
furnishes a report to the SEC under the new section will not be held
liable in any private action for any findings, conclusions, or statements in
the report. However, the willful failure to file a required report will sub-
ject the accountant "and any other person that the [SEC] finds was a
cause of such violation" to cease-and-desist proceedings as well as the
imposition of civil penalties.
E. PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY & RELATED ISSUES
The Litigation Reform Act amends the 1934 Act to add new Section
21D(g) thereto. This new section (i) circumscribes the scope of the cur-
rent joint and several liability scheme; (ii) creates a proportionate liability
framework for actions brought against multiple defendants under the Ex-
change Act or against "outside directors" of the issuer whose securities
are the subject of an action under Section 11 of the Securities Act; and
1996]
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(iii) clarifies several issues relating to partial settlements in federal securi-
ties actions.
First, the statute limits the application of joint and several liability for
damages to apply only if the trier of fact specifically determines that the
defendant in question "knowingly committed" a violation of the federal
securities laws. The section provides that the term "knowingly commit-
ted" requires actual knowledge as the scienter standard and specifically
provides that recklessness cannot constitute a knowing violation. Fur-
ther, the legislation codifies the right to contribution among such joint
tortfeasors recognized by the Supreme Court in Musick, Peeler & Garrett
v. Employers Insurance.4 Under this framework, the legislation provides
that the liability of such defendants is to be premised upon findings of
percentage of responsibility as to each jointly and severally liable
defendant.
Second, by implication, in all actions wherein the "knowingly commit-
ted" scienter standard cannot be proven by the plaintiff but the lesser
standard of recklessness may be shown, the statute creates a proportion-
ate liability scheme and (with certain exceptions) 5 restricts liability for
damages solely to that portion of the judgment that corresponds to the
percentage of each individual defendant's responsibility for plaintiffs'
losses. In addition, if certain individually liable defendants' shares of lia-
bility are uncollectible due to insolvency or some other reason, the statute
requires additional proportionate contributions either from the jointly
and severally liable defendants or, if still uncollectible, from other pro-
portionately liable defendants for those uncollectible shares in certain
specified circumstances.
The statute further provides specific guidelines for determining the per-
centage of each individual defendant's responsibility for damages in the
form of directing the court (i) to instruct the trier of fact to answer special
interrogatories; or (ii) to itself make special findings with respect to mul-
tiple defendants on specific issues. Such issues are to include, among
other things, the percentage of responsibility of each defendant and
whether the defendant "knowingly committed" violations so as to prop-
erly place that defendant within the joint and several liability scheme.
Third, the statute evidently brings an end to the controversy generated
by several recent decisions addressing issues of partial settlements in fed-
eral securities actions by providing for the discharge of all claims for con-
tribution brought by any other persons, whether or not such persons have
themselves settled with the plaintiff, against any defendant that has set-
tled any private action at any time prior to judgment. Moreover, the sec-
4. 508 U.S. 286 (1993). See Barbara Moses & Ronit Setton, Contribution Under Rule
lOb-5, 26 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 159 (1993).
5. For example, a "reckless" violator may be jointly and severally liable in certain
circumstances where the plaintiff is an individual whose recoverable damages exceed 10%
of such plaintiff's net worth and such plaintiff's net worth is less than $200,000. See Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (amend-
ing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to add § 21D(g)).
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tion requires the implementation of a settlement bar order by the court
constituting the discharge of all obligations to the plaintiff of the settling
defendant "arising out of the action." The legislation makes clear that
such bar orders apply to contribution actions brought by and against the
settling defendant.
In addition, the statute provides for a new judgment reduction method
applicable in multidefendant partial settlement cases. This method serves
to reduce the plaintiff's subsequent judgment against any nonsettling de-
fendant by the greater amount of either (1) the proportionate responsibil-
ity of the settling defendant as determined by the court or jury, or (2) the
amount that such a settling defendant has already paid to the plaintiff
pursuant to the respective settlement agreement. This particular judg-
ment reduction method evidently eliminates the controversy engendered
by the Supreme Court's decision in McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 6 which
adopted the proportionate fault method as the proper judgment reduc-
tion method in admiralty cases and was extended to the federal securities
context by several federal courts.
F. SAFE HARBOR FOR CERTAIN FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS
The Litigation Reform Act amends the 1933 Act by adding a new Sec-
tion 27A and further amends the 1934 Act by adding a new Section 21E.
The new sections generally provide 1934 Act reporting companies (as
well as those acting on their behalf and underwriters with respect to in-
formation furnished by or derived from information provided by such
companies) with a safe harbor from liability in private actions for certain
forward-looking statements (for example, projections). The safe harbor
is applicable to both forward-looking written and oral statements, so long
as (1) the statement is identified as a forward-looking statement and is
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, thus codifying the
"bespeaks caution" doctrine; (2) the statement lacks materiality; or (3)
the plaintiff fails to prove that the statement was made with actual knowl-
edge of its falsity (irrespective of whether cautionary language is in-
cluded). This safe harbor applies only to private actions and not to SEC
enforcement actions.
The safe harbor also contains specific provisions for oral forward-look-
ing statements made by an issuer or those acting on its behalf under situa-
tion (1) above. Such oral forward-looking statements are protected if
such statements are accompanied by appropriate cautionary language
and identify "readily available" documentation that sets forth important
factors that could cause results to differ materially from those projected.
The legislation provides that such documentation is to be deemed "read-
ily available" if it is either filed with the SEC or otherwise generally dis-
seminated (for example, a press release carried on the Dow Jones Broad
6. 511 U.S. 202 (1994). See Alan R. Friedman, Contribution and Partial Settlements in




Tape). The applicability of the safe harbor provisions are subject to enu-
merated exclusions in the form of certain excluded issuers (for example,
penny stock issuers) and certain statements in specific instances (for ex-
ample, tender offers).
In addition, the safe harbor section specifies that its provisions do not
impose a duty to update a forward-looking statement. It is unclear
whether this language is meant to eliminate the "duty to update" any
forward-looking statement or merely to clarify that no implied "duty to
update" may be gleaned from this section. Hence, the breadth of this
language will be developed by the courts.
In regard to this legislatively enacted safe harbor for forward-looking
information, the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Commit-
tee is useful:
The first prong of the safe harbor protects a written or oral for-
ward-looking statement that is: (i) identified as forward-looking, and
(ii) accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying
important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially
from those projected in the statement.
Under this first prong of the safe harbor, boilerplate warnings will
not suffice as meaningful cautionary statements identifying impor-
tant factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from
those projected in the statement. The cautionary statements must
convey substantive information about factors that realistically could
cause results to differ materially from those projected in the forward-
looking statement, such as, for example, information about the is-
suer's business.
The second prong of the safe harbor provides an alternative analy-
sis. This safe harbor also applies to both written and oral forward-
looking statements. Instead of examining the forward-looking and
cautionary statements, this prong of the safe harbor focuses on the
state of mind of the person making the forward-looking statement.
A person or business entity will not be liable in a private lawsuit for
a forward-looking statement unless a plaintiff proves that person or
business entity made a false or misleading forward-looking statement
with actual knowledge that it was false or misleading. The Confer-
ence Committee intends for this alternative prong of the safe harbor
to apply if the plaintiff fails to prove the forward-looking statement
(1) if made by a natural person, was made with the actual knowledge
by that person that the statement was false or misleading; or (2) if
made by a business entity, was made by or with the approval of an
executive officer of the entity with actual knowledge by that officer
that the statement was false or misleading.
This legislation permits covered issuers, or persons acting on the
issuer's behalf, to make oral forward-looking statements within the
safe harbor. The person making the forward-looking statement must
identify the statement as a forward-looking statement and state that
results may differ materially from those projected in the statement.
[Vol. 50
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The person must also identify a "readily available" written document
that contains factors that could cause results to differ materially. The
written information identified by the person making the forward-
looking statement must qualify as a "cautionary statement" under
the first prong of the safe harbor (i.e., it must be a meaningful cau-
tionary statement or statements that identify important factors that
could cause actual results to differ materially from those projected in
the forward-looking statement.) For purposes of this provision,
"readily available" information refers to SEC filed documents, an-
nual reports and other widely disseminated materials, such as press
releases. 7
G. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
The Litigation Reform Act adds a new Section 21D(b) to the 1934 Act
setting forth:
(1) A requirement that a plaintiff in the complaint in any private secur-
ities fraud action alleging material misstatements and/or omissions "spec-
ify each statement alleged to have been misleading; the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading; and if an allegation regarding the state-
ment or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall
state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed."
(2) A requirement that in any private action under the 1934 Act in
which the plaintiff "may recover money damages only on proof that the
defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with
respect to each such act or omission alleged to violate [the 1934 Act],
state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the de-
fendant acted with the required state of mind."
As the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Committee for
this legislation recognized, the foregoing language derives "in part" from
the Second Circuit's pleading requirement which is "[r]egarded as the
most stringent pleading standard." Nonetheless, the Conference Com-
mittee apparently believed that this "stringent pleading standard" was
too lax, stating "[b]ecause the Conference Committee intends to
strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the
Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard." In view of
the new statute and its accompanying legislative history, the pleading re-
quirements in private securities fraud actions undoubtedly pose a difficult
barrier for plaintiffs to hurdle.8
7. Conference Report on HR 1058, with Joint Statement of Conference Committee,
27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1881, 1894 (Dec. 1, 1995) (detailing the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Confer-
ence) [hereinafter Joint Explanatory Statement]. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Gros-
kaufmanis, Securities Reform Act Offers Limited Safe Harbor, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 15, 1996, at
B4; Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Litigation Developments: The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine
and Related Defenses, 23 SEC. REG. L.J. 447 (1996).
8. See Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 7. See also Wexner v. First Manhat-
tan Co., 902 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1990); Richard G. Himelrick, Pleading Securities Fraud, 43
MD. L. REv. 342 (1984).
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H. EXPRESS CAUSATION REQUIREMENT
The Litigation Reform Act adds a new Section 21(D)(b)(4) to the 1934
Act. This provision expressly provides that the plaintiff must prove loss
causation in any private action arising under the 1934 Act.
I. DAMAGES
The Litigation Reform Act adds a new Section 21D(e) to the 1934 Act.
In general, this provision places a limitation on damages in 1934 Act ac-
tions where the plaintiff attempts to establish such damages by reference
to the market price of a security. In this context, the award of damages is
the difference between the purchase or sale price paid or received by the
plaintiff, as applicable, and the mean trading price of the security during
the 90-day period beginning on the date on which the information cor-
recting the misstatement or omission that is the basis for the action is
disseminated to the market. For these purposes, the "mean trading
price" of a security is the average of the daily trading price of such secur-
ity, determined as of the close of the market each day during the 90-day
period referred to above. 9
J. SECTION 12(b) OF THE 1933 Ac"
The Litigation Reform Act amends Section 12 of the 1933 Act by ad-
ding a new subsection (Section 12(b)) which provides that in actions
brought under former Section 12(2) (now known as Section 12(a)(2)), a
defendant may avoid all or part of the damages that otherwise would be
incurred by proving that all or part of the depreciation in the value of the
securities in question resulted from factors unrelated to such misstate-
ment or omission.
K. SEC AIDING AND ABETTING AUTHORITY
The Litigation Reform Act amends Section 20 of the 1934 Act by ad-
ding a new subsection (f) to authorize the SEC to seek injunctive relief
and/or certain money penalties against aiders and abettors for violations
of the 1934 Act (or any rule or regulation thereunder). Specifically, the
section provides that any person who "knowingly provides substantial
assistance" to another person in violation of the Exchange Act (or any
rule or regulation thereunder) shall be liable "to the same extent as the
person to whom such assistance is provided." Hence, this section pre-
serves aiding and abetting liability in certain SEC enforcement actions.
Nonetheless, the mental culpability standard (although seemingly requir-
ing actual knowledge) may require clarification.' 0
9. If the plaintiff sells or repurchases the subject security during this time, then this
period terminates on the date on which such plaintiff sells or repurchases the security.
10. The SEC also has cease and desist authority in these circumstances. See MARC I.
STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, 1 SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE EN-




The Litigation Reform Act amends Section 1964(c) of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") generally to elimi-
nate securities fraud as a predicate act in a civil RICO action. According
to the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Committee for the
legislation, the Committee also "intend[ed] that a plaintiff may not plead
other specified offenses, such as mail or wire fraud, as predicate acts
under civil RICO if such offenses are based on conduct that would have
been actionable as securities fraud."" An exception is made, thereby
permitting a civil RICO action to be initiated in this context, when any
person has been criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in
which case the statute of limitations commences to run on the date the
conviction becomes final. 12
M. COMMENTARY
In the final analysis, is the Litigation Reform Act a significant mea-
sure? The answer clearly is "yes" for at least the following reasons:
1. Pleading requirements are strict, thereby establishing a difficult bar-
rier for plaintiffs to hurdle. Discovery at this stage of the litigation gener-
ally is not permitted. Accordingly, fewer actions will be initiated and a
larger number of cases will be dismissed due to the plaintiff's failure to
meet the pleading requirements. The enhanced likelihood of a court or-
dering sanctions in such situations also will deter the bringing of these
lawsuits.
2. The enactment of a proportionate liability framework for "deep
pockets" shifts the balance of power in settlement negotiations. To hold,
for example, an investment banker, broker, accountant, lawyer, or
outside director jointly and severally liable, the plaintiff normally must
show actual knowledge. Otherwise, liability based on proportionate fault
prevails. Hence, an accounting firm that acts "recklessly" and is deemed
4% liable for the loss normally will pay 4% of the damages. Given the
difficulty of pleading and proving actual knowledge along with the emer-
gence of this proportionate liability framework, "deep pockets" no longer
should feel besieged.
3. The safe harbor for certain forward-looking written and oral state-
ments should induce greater flow of "soft" information to the financial
markets. With sufficient cautionary language, certain forward-looking
statements with respect to 1934 Act reporting companies will not be ac-
tionable in private proceedings, even if such statements are material and
made with actual knowledge of their falsity. Coupled with the enhanced
pleading requirements discussed above, a complainant has an onerous
burden to bring a meritorious action. Of course, the safe harbor does not
11. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 7, at 1895.
12. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Securities and Litigation Reform Law,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 21, 1995, at 5.
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apply to SEC actions and is not available for certain issuers, such as those
which are privately-held, and for certain events (such as tender offers and
going-private transactions).
4. Enactment of the Litigation Reform Act signifies that plaintiffs will
resort to the states' securities laws to an even greater extent. In states
such as Texas, which has a remedial securities statute, this increased reli-
ance on state law already has emerged. 13
5. The impact of the institutional investor in the class action setting
remains to be seen. Will the institutions come forward and act as lead
plaintiffs in class actions or will they view the action from the sidelines?
Will the legislation, in fact, deter traditional plaintiff's counsel from insti-
tuting suits on behalf of their small investor clients? Moreover, will there
emerge a legal services market in which "blue chip" law firms are re-
tained by the institutional investor acting as representative party on be-
half of the class to serve as lead counsel? If these uncertainties
eventuate, the map of securities class actions will need to be redrawn.
II. ARTICLES IN THIS SYMPOSIUM
I am honored that an old friend, the Hon. Stanley Sporkin, leads off
this collection. In his lecture "Lawsuits Against the Public Corporation,"
delivered in his keynote address at the 1996 SMU Law Review Corporate
Counsel Symposium, Judge Sporkin suggests a three-pronged approach
for public corporations. He offers a prospective guide for avoiding some
lawsuits, handling the inevitable ones that arise, and preventing some
down the road. His proposals, which include the establishment of a
watchdog Business Practices Officer within the corporate structure, offer
unique and creative perspectives on some of the very problems the
PSLRA is designed to ameliorate.
Professor Douglas Abrams analyzes the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act in terms of its restriction on civil RICO claims in the securi-
ties arena. In Crime Legislation and the Public Interest Lessons from
Civil RICO, he reviews the unanticipated consequences that have flowed
from private RICO actions, and the zealous nature of the "private attor-
neys general" that the Act unknowingly created. Professor Abrams pro-
vides a comprehensive legislative and social history of RICO, showing its
evolution from a crime bill aimed at the Mafia, to the judicial headache
that resulted from the explosion of RICO securities claims in the 1980s.
He surveys the elements of a civil RICO claim, proves its "ready applica-
bility" to securities transactions, and bemoans RICO's metamorphosis
into a general federal antifraud remedy: something which the legislation
was never intended to be. He notes the tremendous drain on judicial
13. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
on Federal and State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489 (1995); Marc I.
Steinberg, The Texas Securities Act: A Plaintiffs Preferred Route?, 58 TEX. B.J. 1096
(1995). See generally MARC 1. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND
REMEDIES § 9.06 (1996).
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resources that has followed, due especially to the complex nature of a
claim brought under the statute.
Professor Abrams then observes the lessons available from the histori-
cal perspective of 25 years of RICO litigation: federalization of crimes is
not always prudent, legislative and executive haste in enacting legislation
often results in bad law, and, unfortunately evident in recent crime legis-
lation, Congress has apparently let RICO's lessons go unheeded. Even
the recent abrogation of RICO causes of action in the securities realm is
less than comforting: other civil RICO actions which are equally burden-
some still exist.
In Chasing the Rogue Professional After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Professor Douglas Branson analyzes professional lia-
bility as it applies to the large number of "collateral participants" in a
securities issuance. He points out, however, that under the federal securi-
ties regime as enacted and construed by the judiciary, pursuit of fraudu-
lent conduct allegedly engaged in by securities-related professionals has
become increasingly difficult.
With favored causes of action now seemingly closed, Professor Branson
suggests bringing these rogues to justice through alternative means: pri-
mary liability, individual or group litigation instead of class actions, blue
sky claims under state law, liability under state corporation laws, and
common law theories such as negligent misrepresentation. He concludes
that, because of the Reform Act and the recent federal case law, unless a
smoking gun or direct involvement is found, remedies premised on state
law may be the last refuge of allegedly victimized investors.
In Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board-The
History of a Symptom and a Cure, Professor Charles Elson provides us
with the first of two articles in this Symposium related to compensation of
insiders. Professor Elson argues for an alternative system of director
compensation, one that will more closely align directors' interests with
those of the shareholders and which will encourage "active management
oversight." His solution is relatively straightforward: compensate the di-
rectors with company stock in lieu of cash.
Professor Elson identifies the evils of a passive board of directors
which rubber-stamps the insiders' decisions, and which fails to monitor
and challenge management properly. He points out the abuses which
necessarily flow from rewarding directors with pensions for length of ser-
vice, large consulting contracts, and charitable contribution programs.
He draws support from the recent report issued by the National Associa-
tion of Corporate Directors' Commission on Director Compensation and
"explain[s] why the current movement towards equity-based compensa-
tion will reunite ownership and control to create more active board over-
sight of management and a healthier, more competitive corporation. ' 14
14. Charles Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board-The
History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REv. 127, 135 (1996).
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Professor Janet Kerr joins us with Ralston Redux: Determining Which
Section 3 Offerings Are Public Under Section 12(2) After Gustafson. Pro-
fessor Kerr notes that in the wake of Gustafson,15 the Supreme Court left
questions unanswered as to which offerings, besides registered offerings,
fall under Section 12(2) (now Section 12(a)(2)). She argues that the cor-
rect approach for these "other" offerings is to rely on the "fend for one-
self' analysis promulgated by the Supreme Court almost a half-century
ago in Ralston Purina.16 She summarizes the two primary critiques of
Gustafson: (1) that the Court used a narrower definition of "prospectus"
culled from Section 10, rather than the wider and more appropriate defi-
nition found in Section 2(10); and (2) that the Court wrongly applied its
Section 10 definition uniformly. across the breadth of the Act, in clear
violation of standard statutory interpretation.
Professor Kerr advocates classifying two groups as "self-fending" under
the Ralston Purina analysis, for whom Section 3 offerings would be pri-
vate and thus excluded from Section 12(2). These two groups, "insiders"
on the one hand and "sophisticated" investors on the other, would pro-
vide a bright-line test for issuers, and would preclude the confusion inher-
ent in the wake of Gustafson.
In Reflections on Executive Compensation and a Modest Proposal for
(Further) Reform, Professor Mark Loewenstein examines the govern-
ment's (and the public's) continuing fascination with executive compen-
sation. He begins with a survey of the extant literature on the subject,
and notes that, in spite of a relative paucity of sound empirical evidence
on the subject, it is often the perception of overcompensation that needs
to be addressed, whether or not overcompensation is actually present.
He then analyzes recent judicial oversight of executive compensation,
most notably through the Delaware Aronson17 case and the Missouri
Saigh18 case. He argues that the procedural roadblocks set forth in such
cases, based in the state corporation statutes, cause shareholder protec-
tions enunciated in Rogers v. Hill19 to be nothing more than dead-letter
law.
Professor Loewenstein then examines the SEC's attempts to regulate
executive compensation, and Congress's attempts to do the same through
the Internal Revenue Code. Neither of these approaches is satisfactory
in his view, as they provide a cumbersome framework whose policy goals
are undermined by their reliance on "performance-based" compensation.
In short, linking a CEO's pay to the price of the stock may not always be
a good idea from the investor's or the company's point of view. Professor
Loewenstein's proposal is that shareholders be allowed a separate "ratifi-
cation vote" on executive compensation. Such a vote would both allow
15. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
16. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
17. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
18. Saigh v. Busch, 396 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
19. 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
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shareholders a voice on this explosive issue, and would also serve to quiet
the annual firestorm linked to the disclosure of CEO pay. Such a vote
would also allow a Board to ascertain the opinions of shareholders from
year to year and in the long-term adjust CEO compensation accordingly.
Professor Richard Painter and Ms. Jennifer Duggan in Lawyer Disclo-
sure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation observe that
while the Act goes a long way towards remedying egregious conduct by
accountants in an issuance of securities, it omits some key players from its
scope: the lawyers. The courts and the SEC have held lawyers to some
liability standard in securities transactions, but over the years that stan-
dard has undergone changes which make it difficult for counsel to plan
and act accordingly.
Professor Painter and Ms. Duggan argue that by leaving lawyers out of
the applicable liability provisions of the Act, Congress has placed securi-
ties attorneys in greater danger than before. In short, liability for counsel
is now left up to the courts, foregoing the predictability that accountants
now enjoy. While the two professions have always been treated differ-
ently, the authors' proposal for at least defining the standard of care of
securities counsel may be a welcome addition to the Act. They conclude
with several proposals that would help counsel define his or her role and
thereby limit liability. Methods for detecting client fraud, notifying the
Board of Directors, resigning from representation (and "waving the red
flag"), and disclosure to the SEC (with attendant opt-in or opt-out de-
fault provisions) are among the proposals advocated.
In Making Securities Arbitration Work, Professor Norman Poser ob-
serves that "It]he fact that parties who signed an agreement to arbitrate
future disputes find themselves forced to litigate collateral issues tends to
defeat the unique advantages of arbitration. '20 He details the history of
securities arbitration and the litigation surrounding it, especially the fed-
eral courts' evolving willingness to enforce arbitration. He takes the
reader through the different aspects and issues attendant to securities ar-
bitration, including the collateral issues most often litigated: scope, eligi-
bility, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and choice of forum and venue.
Professor Posner argues that two, and only two, questions should be
left to the courts: arbitrability and limited judicial review of arbitration
awards. All other issues should be decided by the applicable arbitration
panel. For arbitrability, moreover, a four-part test should be used by the
courts to help establish prospective predictability: (1) whether the parties
have agreed to arbitrate; (2) the scope of the agreement; (3) whether
Congress intended the claims to be arbitrable; and (4) whether the trial of
any non-arbitrable claims should be stayed, pending the arbitration.
In Contribution and Proportionate Liability Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws in Multidefendant Securities Litigation After the Private Securi-




ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Mr. Christopher Olive and I analyze
Title II of that legislation.
Prior to the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
many issues with respect to partial settlements and contribution actions
remained largely unresolved in multidefendant securities litigation. Par-
tial settlements occur when at least one defendant settles with the plain-
tiffs or plaintiff-class, while other non-settling defendants remain in the
litigation. The driving force behind partial settlements is the desire to
avoid potential exposure for joint and several liability, particularly in se-
curities fraud actions. Joint and several liability implies that defendants,
regardless of their degree of culpability, could be potentially liable for all
of the damages awarded to plaintiffs.
Two classic partial settlement scenarios normally arise with respect to
settling defendants. First, so-called "deep pocket" professional defend-
ants will settle, notwithstanding their relatively lesser culpability, in order
to avoid being subject to enormous liability for the actions of more culpa-
ble defendants. Second, the more culpable defendants will settle with
plaintiffs if their estimated settlement value is less than the projected
costs in litigation and adjudication relative to their perceived degrees of
culpability. In either situation, the settling defendants would almost cer-
tainly be subject to future litigation with non-settling defendants, in the
form of contribution and related actions, so they successfully petition
courts to implement settlement bar orders to eliminate such future litiga-
tion. The imposition of settlement bar orders, and the implementation of
judgment reduction methods used to compensate non-settling defendants
for the loss of these rights against the settling defendants, create complex
partial settlement issues which have plagued courts and commentators for
years.
In enacting Title II of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Congress established significant limitations on joint and several lia-
bility and created a proportionate liability regime for certain less culpable
defendants. Title II thus revolutionizes multidefendant securities litiga-
tion, and provides significant protection for marginally culpable
defendants.
Importantly, pursuant to the 1995 legislation, Congress addressed
many of the complex partial settlement issues and established a judgment
reduction method for both settling and non-settling defendants in mul-
tidefendant securities litigation. Although the Title II provisions have
been touted as a major success in litigation reform and necessary to ame-
liorate abusive class action securities fraud lawsuits, the impact of Title II
extends far beyond securities fraud actions.
Professor Manning Warren in the Symposium's closing article authors
The Primary Liability of Securities Lawyers. There, he analyzes the effect
of the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank.21 Professor Warren ar-
21. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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gues that a shift from "secondary" aiding and abetting liability for securi-
ties lawyers to "primary" Section 10(b) liability, in practical terms, may
effect little change. He provides a comprehensive survey of a securities
lawyer's duties in a securities offering, especially as they concern the dis-
closure process for which he or she may be held liable.
Professor Warren provides a detailed analysis of case law, asserting
that a securities lawyer's role, since it is highly specialized, is sometimes
little understood by jurists without a securities background. He con-
cludes with a treatment of the applicable standards of care, and deter-
mines that not only is primary liability now the controlling law, but that it
is appropriate as well.
In conclusion, I would like to thank the Board of Editors and Staff of
the SMU Law Review for organizing this Symposium. I also thank the
authors of this Symposium, many of whom have been my friends for
years and others whom I have met more recently. This Symposium is a
superb collection of articles and I am pleased to participate.

